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1 Introduction
The question of how the international transmission of …scal policy shocks
depends on the composition of government spending has received very little
attention in the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM)1 literature.
In NOEM models, government spending is virtually always pure waste and
does not a¤ect private utility or productivity. However, any role for …scal
policy requires that government spending is someway useful. One way to
motivate government spending is to introduce government consumption that
yields utility, as in Ganelli (2003). Another way to motivate government
spending is to assume public services that a¤ect production. In this paper,
we consider the role of public services as a productive input for private
producers, as e.g. in Barro (1990). The idea of productive government
spending is commonly used in the economic growth literature.2 The idea
is also used in the business cycle literature in Turnovsky and Fisher (1995)
and Linnemann and Schabert (2006), using closed economy models. On
the other hand, in the NOEM literature the consequences of productive
government spending have been ignored. This paper attempts to …ll a gap
in the literature by analyzing the consequences of productive government
spending on the international transmission of …scal policy.
The introduction of productive government spending seems to be impor-
tant in the light of the results of Linnemann and Schabert (2006). Recent
empirical papers show that the e¤ects of …scal expansions on real wages and
private consumption are positive (Blanchard and Perotti 2002, Canzoneri et
al. 2003 and Gali et al. 2004). This evidence is not easily reconciled with
in…nite-lived, intertemporally optimizing households. Typically, a rise in
government spending implies a reduction in wealth. This reduces private
consumption and leads to an increase in labor supply, lowering the real
wage. Linnemann and Schabert (2006) show that if government spending
generates su¢ciently strong production externality, a rise in government
spending does not imply a fall in wealth and private consumption. In ad-
dition, the real wage does not need to fall because productive government
spending increases the marginal product of labor.
Literature on the international transmission of …scal policy has been al-
most exclusively theoretical. In an important empirical paper, Arin and
Koray (2006) investigate how U.S. …scal policy a¤ects the U.S. economy
and how these shocks are transmitted to the Canadian economy. Using a
semi-structural VAR model, the authors …nd that U.S. output increases and
Canadian output decreases in response to a positive shock to U.S. govern-
1An excellent survey of the NOEM literature by Lane (2001) focuses completely on
monetary policy issues. Lane and Ganelli (2003) survey more recent developments in the
literature and also …scal policy issues. Coutinho (2005) focuses completely on …scal policy
issues.
2See Turnovsky (2000).
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ment spending. One aim of this paper is to address the question of why a
…scal expansion causes an increase in domestic output and a fall in foreign
output, as the results of Arin and Koray (2006) suggest.
A two-country NOEM model is a natural candidate for analyzing the
questions we address in this paper because two-country NOEM models high-
light "international transmission channels and allows interest rates and as-
set prices to be endogenously determined in international capital markets"
(Lane 2001, 256). The model presented in paper is based on Betts and De-
vereux (2000). We make two modi…cations to their model. The …rst is the
use of staggered price setting. The second is the assumption of productive
government spending.
Most of the contributions that address the international transmission of
…scal shocks, including the seminal Redux model of Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(1995), assume that export prices are set in the producer’s currency. On the
other hand, motivated by the weak empirical support for the law of one price
in internationally traded goods, the evidence of limited exchange rate pass-
through to import prices and the sources of real exchange rate ‡uctuations,
among others Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000, 2001) have assumed that
export prices can be set in the consumers’currency. The model presented
in this paper is based on the local-currency pricing (LCP) paradigm in which
the prices of imported goods are temporarily rigid in the importing country’s
currency.
We show that the introduction of productive government spending has
signi…cant implications for the international e¤ects of …scal shocks. As in
the closed economy model of Linnemann and Schabert (2006), domestic
private consumption can decrease or increase depending on the productivity
of government spending. A rise in government spending tends to decrease
domestic private consumption due to the rise in taxes. On the other hand,
when government spending is productive, free inputs that the government
provides to producers cause a positive e¤ect on output and consequently
consumption. If the productivity of government spending is low (or zero),
the former e¤ect dominates. Thus a rise in government spending induces
a fall in consumption. The e¤ect of productive government spending on
output and consumption is however positive, compared with the pure waste
case. When government spending generates a su¢ciently strong e¤ect on
production, the positive e¤ect (that free inputs induce) on consumption
o¤sets the fall in consumption caused by higher taxes. Hence, domestic
consumption increases, consistent with empirical evidence (Blanchard and
Perotti 2002, Canzoneri et al. 2003 and Gali et al. 2004). The impact on
foreign output is roughly consistent with the empirical …nding of Arin and
Koray (2006): the impact on foreign output is negative; only immediately
after the shock the impact is positive. In addition, soon after the shock,
productive government spending reinforces the negative e¤ect on foreign
output. However, the e¤ect of productive government spending on foreign
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consumption is always positive because of a higher current account surplus
which allows for a higher level of consumption.
We also demonstrate that the assumption of productivity government
spending has notable implications for the response of the exchange rate
to a …scal shock. As in the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model (1995, 1996), relative
consumption changes a¤ect the exchange rate by changing relative money
demand. As mentioned, if the productivity of government spending is low
or zero, a rise in government spending causes a fall in domestic consump-
tion. Thus the relative consumption change decreases the relative demand
for domestic money and consequently the exchange rate depreciates. How-
ever, the assumption of productive government spending moderates the de-
preciation of the nominal and real exchange rate, compared with the pure
waste case. On the other hand, if the productivity of government spend-
ing is su¢ciently high, domestic consumption increases more than foreign
consumption. Therefore, the nominal and real exchange rate appreciate
because the relative consumption change increases the relative demand for
domestic money. In addition, if the productivity of government spending is
su¢ciently high (low), a …scal shock temporarily raises (lowers) the world
interest rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out
the model and derive the equilibrium conditions. In Section 3 we use illus-
trative numerical calculations to analyze the international transmission of
…scal policy. As hinted above, we emphasize the consequences of productive
government spending. Finally, in Section 4 we provide some conclusions.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop a fairly standard NOEM model. The model is
based on Betts and Devereux (2000). We extend their model by allowing for
a staggered price setting framework and productive government spending.
2.1 Households
The world is made of two countries, Home and Foreign, and is populated by
a continuum of households. Each household produces a single di¤erentiated
good, indexed by z. We normalize the world size to 1 and consider that
…rst n households reside in the Home country. All households have identical
preferences. The utility function of a typical Home household is given by
Ut (z) =
1X
s=t
¯s¡t
"
log Cs +
Â
1 ¡ "
µ
Ms
Ps
¶1¡"
¡ `s (z)
2
2
#
: (1)
In this equation Ct is a consumption basket (to be de…ned below), Mt is
nominal balances, Pt is the consumer price index (to be de…ned below), "
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is the inverse of the consumption elasticity of money demand and ` denotes
the labour supply. In equation (1) variable C is a real consumption index
C =
24 1Z
0
c(z)
µ¡1
µ dz
35
µ
µ¡1
;
where c(z) is consumption of good z and µ (> 1) is the elasticity of substi-
tution between di¤erentiated goods.
The Home country CPI is
Pt =
24 nZ
0
pt (z)
1¡µ dz +
Z 1
n
pt (z
¤)1¡µ dz
35 11¡µ ; (2)
where p (z) denotes the Home currency price of a Home-produced good z
and p (z¤) is the Home currency price of a Foreign good z.
A Foreign households’s utility function is completely identical to that of
a Home household. The Foreign country CPI is
P ¤t =
24 nZ
0
p¤t (z)
1¡µ dz +
Z 1
n
p¤t (z
¤)1¡µ dz
35 11¡µ ; (3)
where p¤ (z) is the Foreign currency price of a Home good z and p¤ (z¤) is
the Foreign currency price of the Foreign-produced good.
The Home country’s import and export price indexes, respectively, are
de…ned as
bt (z
¤) =
·Z 1
n
pt (z
¤)1¡µ dz
¸ 1
1¡µ
;
b¤t (z) =
24 nZ
0
p¤t (z)
1¡µ dz
35 11¡µ :
For future reference, the Home terms of trade, the relative price of Home
imports in terms of Home exports, can be expresses as
TOTt =
bt (z¤)
Etb¤t (z)
; (4)
where E is the nominal exchange rate (the Home currency price of Foreign
currency).
The budget constraint of a typical Home household is
Mt + ±tDt = Dt¡1 + Mt¡1 + wt`t ¡ PtCt + ¼t ¡ Pt¿ t; (5)
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where Mt is the money holding at the beginning of the period and ±t is the
nominal price of a bond (± = (1 + R)¡1, where R is the nominal Home inter-
est rate). In addition, Dt denotes holdings of Home currency denominated
nominal bonds, w is the nominal wage rate , ¼ represents the nominal pro…ts
of Home …rms (Home households own Home …rms and Foreign households
own Foreign …rms) and ¿ denotes per capita taxes.
There is an integrated world capital market and the only asset households
trade is a nominal bond, denominated in Home currency. The aggregate
asset-market-clearing conditions is thus given by nDt + (1 ¡ n)D¤t = 0.
Then the budget constraint of a representative Foreign household is
M¤t + ±
¤
t
D¤t
Et
=
D¤t¡1
Et
+ M¤t¡1 + w
¤
t `
¤
t ¡ P ¤t C¤t + ¼¤t ¡ P ¤t ¿¤t : (6)
2.2 First-Order Conditions for the Typical Household’s Prob-
lem
A typical Home household maximizes the utility function subject to the
budget constraint, speci…ed in equation (5). The …rst-order condition for
optimal consumption is
±tPt+1Ct+1 = ¯PtCt: (7)
This Euler equation states that the household smooths consumption. The
…rst-order condition governing the household’s optimal labour supply can
be written as
`t =
wt
CtPt
: (8)
Equation (8) ensures that the marginal disutility of labour equals the mar-
ginal utility of consumption. Finally, the …rst-order condition for the house-
hold’s money demand can be written as
Mt
Pt
=
·
ÂCt
µ
1
1 ¡ ±t
¶¸ 1
"
: (9)
This equation states that the optimal amount of money balances is a positive
function of consumption and a negative function of the interest rate.
A Foreign household’s optimal labour supply is analogous to that of a
Home household. In addition, a Foreign household’s optimal consumption
and money demand can be written as
±¤tP
¤
t+1C
¤
t+1Et+1 = ¯P
¤
t C
¤
t Et; (10)
M¤t
P ¤t
=
"
ÂC¤t
Ã
1
1 ¡ ±¤Et+1Et
!# 1
"
: (11)
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2.3 The Government
Assume that governments in both countries balance their budgets each pe-
riod and …nance their spending by means of non-distortionary taxes and
seignorage. The Home government budget constraint, expressed in per
capita terms, is given by
Gt = ¿ t +
Mt ¡ Mt¡1
Pt
. (12)
Government spending is assumed to follow a …rst-order autoregressive process
G^t = ½G^t¡1 + shock:
In the preceding equation, ½ governs the persistence of a …scal shock and
the hat notation is used to represent the percentage deviations from the
initial steady state. The Foreign country’s budget constraint, government
composite consumption and government spending are analogously de…ned.
2.4 Firms
2.4.1 Technology and Pro…ts
We assume the role of public services as an input to private production, as
in Barro (1990). In this case, we assume that public services are publicly-
provided private goods, which are rival and excludable. Thus, public services
are not subject to congestion e¤ects and the model abstracts from external-
ities associated with the use of public services. As pointed out by Barro
(1990), the general idea of including public services a separate argument of
the production function is that private inputs are not a close substitute for
public inputs. We assume that the ‡ow of public services that enter the
production function corresponds to (per capita) government spending.
Each …rm, with the total number normalized to unity, produces a di¤er-
entiated good. The production function of Home …rm z is (the situation of
Foreign …rms is completely analogous)
yt (z) = `t (z)G
®
t ;
where yt (z) is the total output of …rm z and parameter ® (0 · ®) captures
the degree of a positive e¤ect that government spending induces on the …rm’s
production.
Total output is divided between output sold at the Home market, de-
noted by xt (z), and output sold at the Foreign market, denoted by vt (z).
Firm z minimizes cost wt`t (z) subject to the above technology. The nominal
marginal cost is given by
MCt (z) =
wt
G®
: (13)
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The pro…ts of a Home …rm are given by
¼t (z) = pt (z)xt (z) + Etp
¤
t (z) vt (z) ¡ wt`t (z) : (14)
The …rst term on the right hand side is revenues from Home sales and the
second term is revenues from Foreign sales. The total output of a Foreign
…rm is divided between output sold at the Home market, denoted by v¤t (z¤),
and output sold at the Foreign market, denoted by x¤t (z¤). The pro…ts of a
Foreign …rm are given by
¼¤t (z
¤) = p¤t (z
¤)x¤t (z
¤) +
pt (z¤) v¤t (z¤)
Et
¡ w¤t `¤t (z¤) : (15)
Given composite consumption indexes and integrating demand for good
z across all households, we see that the demand functions for a typical Home
…rm’s output are given by
xt (z) =
µ
pt (z)
Pt
¶¡µ
(nCt + nGt) ;
vt (z) =
µ
p¤t (z)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
[(1 ¡ n) C¤t + (1 ¡ n)G¤t ] :
These equations represent goods market clearing conditions for a typical
Home …rm in Home and Foreign market, respectively. Analogously, the
demand functions for a typical Foreign …rm in Home and Foreign market,
respectively, are given by
v¤t (z
¤) =
µ
pt (z
¤)
Pt
¶¡µ
(nCt + nGt) ;
x¤t (z
¤) =
µ
p¤t (z¤)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
[(1 ¡ n) C¤t + (1 ¡ n)G¤t ] :
Making use of goods market clearing conditions, the pro…t functions of
a typical Home and Foreign …rm can be written as
¼t (z) =
"µ
p¤t (z)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
[(1 ¡ n)C¤t + (1 ¡ n)G¤t ]
#
(Etp
¤
t (z) vt (z) ¡ MCt (z)) +"µ
pt (z)
Pt
¶¡µ
(nCt + nGt)
#
(pt (z) ¡ MCt (z)) ; (16)
¼¤t (z
¤) =
"µ
p¤t (z¤)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
[(1 ¡ n)C¤t + (1 ¡ n) G¤t ]
#
(p¤t (z
¤) ¡ MC¤t (z¤))
+
"µ
pt (z
¤)
Pt
¶¡µ
(nCt + nGt)
#µ
pt (z
¤)
Et
¡ MC¤t (z¤)
¶
:
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2.4.2 Staggered Price Setting
We assume that …rms set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo (1983).
But before turning to staggered adjustment, we …rst examine the optimal
price setting under complete price ‡exibility. Since monopoly …rms can
price-discriminate across countries, that are free to set di¤erent prices across
countries to maximize pro…ts. However, given the pro…t function [equation
(16)], a pro…t maximizing Home …rm ends up choosing prices that are a
constant markup over marginal costs
pt (z) = Etp
¤
t (z) =
µ
µ ¡ 1MCt (z)
such that the law of one price holds. The price setting problem facing a
typical Foreign …rm is also identical to that of a Home …rm, and it chooses
prices that are a constraint markup over Foreign marginal costs.
In the short run, prices are sticky. Following Calvo (1983) we assume
that each …rm resets its price in any given period with probability 1 ¡ °,
independently of time elapsed since the last price adjustment. Each …rm has
to take this into account when setting its pro…t-maximizing price that there
is a probability 0 < ° < 1 that it cannot revise its price setting decision
made in period s (s < t) in period t. When setting a new price in period t,
…rm z seeks to maximize the present value of pro…ts weighting future pro…ts
by the probability that the price will still be e¤ective in period s. Thus a
typical Home …rm seeks to maximize
max
pt(z);p¤t (z)
Vt (z) =
1X
s=t
°s¡t³ t;s¼t (z) ;
where ³s;t = ¦
t
j=s (1 + Rj)
¡1 is the Home nominal discount factor. The
optimal price setting strategy for a Home …rm is to set the following prices
pt (z) =
µ
µ
µ ¡ 1
¶ P1
s=t °
s¡t³t;s (Cs + Gs)
³
1
Ps
´¡µ
MCs (z)P1
s=t °
s¡t³ t;s (Cs + Gs)
³
1
Ps
´¡µ ; (17)
p¤t (z) =
µ
µ
µ ¡ 1
¶ P1
s=t °
s¡t³t;s (C¤s + G¤s)
³
1
P¤s
´¡µ
MCs (z)P1
s=t °
s¡t³ t;s (C¤s + G¤s)
³
1
P¤s
´¡µ
Et
: (18)
Equation (17) is the pro…t maximizing Home currency price of a good sold in
the Home country and equation (18) governs the pro…t maximizing Foreign
currency price of a good sold in the Foreign country. The price setting
problem facing Foreign …rms is again identical to that of a Home …rm. The
optimal Home currency price of a Foreign good sold in the Home country and
Foreign currency price of a good sold in the Foreign country are, respectively
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pt (z
¤) =
µ
µ
µ ¡ 1
¶ P1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;s (Cs + Gs)
³
1
Ps
´¡µ
MC¤s (z¤)P1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;s (Cs + Gs)
³
1
Ps
´¡µ
=Et
; (19)
p¤t (z
¤) =
µ
µ
µ ¡ 1
¶ P1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;s (C¤s + G¤s)
³
1
P¤s
´¡µ
MC¤s (z¤)P1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;s (C¤s + G¤s)
³
1
P ¤s
´¡µ : (20)
2.5 Symmetric Equilibrium
All …rms in the country are symmetric, which implies that they set the same
output and when resetting prices in any given period they choose the same
price. The law of large numbers implies that each period a measure of 1¡°
of the …rms reset their prices while a fraction ° keep their prices unchanged.
In this symmetric equilibrium, the consolidated budget constraint of the
Home economy is derived by using equation (5), the government budget
constraint (12) and the pro…ts of a Home …rm (14). It can be written as
±tDt = Dt¡1 + pt (z)xt (z) + Etp¤t (z) v (z) ¡ PtCt ¡ PtGt:
Analogously, the consolidated budget constraint of the Foreign economy is
derived by using corresponding Foreign equations together with the asset-
market-clearing condition
¡ n
1 ¡ n±
¤
t
Dt
Et
= ¡ n
1 ¡ n
Dt¡1
Et
+p¤t (z
¤)x¤t (z
¤)+
pt (z¤) v¤t (z¤)
Et
¡P ¤t C¤t ¡P ¤t G¤t :
Following previous work we consider the special case of zero net Foreign
assets and equal government spending levels. In addition, in this steady
state all exogenous variables are constant. Constant consumption implies
that the steady-state world interest rate is tied down by consumption Euler
equations (7) and (10): ¯ = ¹± =
¡
1 + ¹R
¢¡1, where steady-state values are
marked by overbars.
The linearization is implemented by expressing the model in terms of
percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Those variables whose
initial steady-state value is zero are normalized by consumption. Equilib-
rium is sequences of variables that (i) clear the labour, goods and money
markets in each region in each period, (ii) satisfy the optimality conditions
for consumption evolution, (iii) satisfy the optimal pricing rules and (iv)
satisfy the intertemporal budget constraints.
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2.6 The Choice of Parameters
The choice of parameter values follows Sutherland (1996). The main as-
sumptions underlying the choice of parameter values are as follows. The
elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods µ is set to 6, a value
consistent with a 20 percent mark-up in the steady state. The subjective
discount factor ¯ is set to 1/1.05. Parameter °, the probability of not ad-
justing prices in any given period, is set equal to 0.5. This implies an average
delay between price adjustments of two periods. We set " = 9 which implies
a rather low consumption elasticity of money demand (1="). The two coun-
ties are of equal size, and thus n is set to 0.5. Parameter ½ is set to one due
to the fact that government spending shocks are permanent.
In addition, to highlight the consequences of productive government
spending, we need parameter value for ®. We use the estimate of the output
elasticity of public capital as a proxy for the positive e¤ect that government
spending exerts on the …rms’production. Aschauer (1989) found a widely
cited estimate of the productivity of public capital of 0.39. The majority
of later studies have found estimates of the productivity of public capital
that are between zero and Aschauer’s (1989) estimate.3 For example, Ai
and Cassou’s (1995) estimates of the output elasticity of public capital are
in the range of 0.15 to 0.26. Our baseline choice is ® = 0:2. In order to
numerically solve the model, we use the method developed by Klein (2000)
and software written by McCallum (2001).4
3 The International Transmission of Fiscal Shocks
3.1 The Implications of Productive Government Spending
We begin by discussing the dynamic e¤ects of an unanticipated permanent
increase in Home government spending on a number of economic variables.
We consider two alternative cases, in one case government spending a¤ects
productivity and in the other case government spending is pure waste. Fig-
ures 1 illustrate the impulse responses to a 1 percent unilateral increase in
Home government spending. In Figures, the horizontal axes show time and
the vertical axes show the variables’percentage deviations from the initial
steady state.5 In addition, the CPI-based real exchange rate is de…ned as
Real exchange rate =
EtP
¤
t
Pt
.
3See Glomm and Ravikumar (1997).
4 I am grateful to Christian Pierdzioch for providing some Matlab code.
5Since those variables, whose initial steady-state value is zero are normalized by con-
sumption, home bond holdings show deviation as a percentage of initial consumption
level.
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As can be seen from Figure 1, a rise in Home government spending causes
Home and Foreign output to move in the same direction immediately after
the shock. Home consumption falls and Foreign consumption rises, so that
the cross country comovement of consumption levels is negative.
A rise in Home government spending increases the demand for both
Home and Foreign goods, but domestic households foot the taxes that …-
nance it. Higher taxes lead to an immediate fall in Home wealth and con-
sumption, but because households respond by substituting into work out
of leisure at the same time, the net e¤ect on world aggregate demand is
positive. A permanent rise in government spending implies a permanent
reduction in private consumption and thus the increase in labor supply is
similarly permanent.
When public services enter into the production function, government
spending has a direct positive e¤ect on Home output. At the same time,
productive government spending decreases the marginal costs of Home …rms
allowing the …rms to sell their products at lower prices. It is not shown
that in the case of the pure waste, the increase in labor supply lowers the
real wage. But when government spending is su¢ciently productive, the
real wage does not fall. As in Linnemann and Schabert (2006), despite
higher employment the marginal product of labor can increase because of
the productivity e¤ect of government spending. The positive response of real
wages to a rise in government spending is supported by empirical evidence
(Blanchard and Perotti 2002, Canzoneri et al. 2003 and Gali et al. 2004).
The nominal exchange rate depreciates because the relative consumption
change lowers the relative demand for Home money. If government spending
is productive, the relative consumption change is smaller and consequently
the nominal exchange rate depreciates by less. As shown by Betts and Dev-
ereux (2000), under LCP, exchange rate overshooting can occur in response
to economic shocks.6 Panel (e) in Figure 1 highlights that the nominal ex-
change rate overshoots its long-run level. As in Betts and Devereux (2000),
exchange rate overshooting (undershooting) occurs in response to a …scal
shock if the consumption elasticity of money demand is smaller (greater)
than one. The interest rate must fall to clear the Home money market and
a fall in the Home interest rate is possible if the exchange rate is expected
to appreciate. The exchange rate, therefore, has to overshoot its long-run
equilibrium inducing an interest rate di¤erential that equals the rate of ap-
preciation. However, a rise in government spending temporarily lowers the
interest rate in both countries.
When prices are sticky and denominated in the currency of the buyer, the
movement in the nominal exchange rate translates into a real depreciation.
6 In the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model, the nominal exchange rate jumps immediately to its
long-run level. Also in Sutherland’s (1996) calibrated model, which introduces staggered
price setting into the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model, the nominal exchange rate makes a once-
and-for-all step change in response to monetary and …scal shocks.
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If government spending is productive, due to a smaller nominal exchange
rate depreciation the real exchange rate depreciates by less than in the pure
waste case. As prices can be adjusted, the real exchange moves back towards
its original level. The assumption of identical consumption baskets together
with the law of one price (under ‡exible prices) implies a constant real
exchange in the long run.
Due to LCP, there is no exchange rate pass-through to import prices
and thus the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate does not a¤ect the
relative price of Home and Foreign goods in either country. Consequently,
the assumption of full LCP eliminates the expenditure switching e¤ect as-
sociated with unexpected changes in the nominal exchange rate. In the
case of LCP, exchange rate movements, instead of altering relative prices,
have important implications for the revenues of …rms [recall equations (14)
and (15)]. When …rms price their goods in terms of local currency, the de-
preciation raises the revenues of Home …rms measured in Home currency
terms, and reduces the revenues of Foreign …rms measured in Foreign cur-
rency terms, at given production levels. Therefore, the depreciation causes
a redistribution of income towards the Home economy and this e¤ect raises
Home consumption relative to Foreign consumption. However, this e¤ect is
more than o¤set by higher taxes and thus this e¤ect only diminishes the fall
in Home consumption.
Panel (g) in Figure 1 shows some wealth accumulation by Foreign house-
holds immediately after the shock and that productive government spending
reinforces the impact of a …scal shock on the bond holdings of Foreign house-
holds. Foreign output increases in the short run. Therefore, to smooth con-
sumption, Foreign households save and lower current consumption. Panel
(d) displays that if government spending is productive a …scal shock induces
a greater tilt in the path of output. Thus, Foreign households accumulate
more wealth. A permanent improvement in the bond holdings of Foreign
households implies allows for a permanent trade balance de…cit which is …-
nanced by income from interest. This trade balance de…cit make possible
higher Foreign consumption.
As can be seen from panel (h), the Home terms of trade deteriorates. The
reason for the deterioration is the increase in relative Home output. Lower
wealth via the current account leads to some increase in work e¤ort, but
the main reason for the increase in Home output is the higher tax burden.
The negative wealth e¤ects increase relative Home output thus causing a
permanent deterioration in its terms of trade. If government spending is
productive, the Home terms of trade deteriorates by more because Home
…rms sell their extra production at lower prices.
Panel (c) in Figure 1 shows that the in‡uence of productive Home gov-
ernment spending on Foreign consumption is positive. The reason behind
this is that when government spending is productive both higher Foreign
wealth and the improvement in the Foreign terms of trade allow Foreign
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households to increase their consumption. A closer look at Panel (d) reveals
that a …scal shock is predicted to slightly decrease Foreign output in the new
steady state. The reason is that with higher wealth (consumption), Foreign
households shift out of work into leisure. If the impact on Foreign aggregate
output is small, the composition of output changes as the country’s export
sector expands.
Panel (d) also reveals that the introduction of productive government
spending has a negative spillover e¤ect on Foreign output in the long run.
Higher consumption, which pushes Foreign households to consume more
leisure, explains why the consequence of productive Home government spend-
ing on Foreign output is negative in the long run. This impact is certainly
very small.
Arin and Koray (2006) study how U.S. …scal expansions in the U.S.
a¤ect the U.S. economy and these expansions are transmitted to the Cana-
dian economy. Using a semi-structural VAR model, the authors …nd that
U.S. …scal expansions have a beggar-thy-neighbor e¤ect on Canada and that
expansions are transmitted by international trade and capital movement
through interest rate and exchange rate channels. Furthermore, the authors
show that the decrease in Canadian output is signi…cantly di¤erent from
zero after the 4th quarter. This is roughly consistent with the predictions of
this model; a …scal expansion however increases Foreign output immediately
after the shock.
The analysis of this section suggests that the macroeconomic e¤ects of
…scal policy are not sensitive to the introduction of productive government
spending. The introduction of production government spending does not
cause qualitative changes; the consequences on the macroeconomic variables
are purely quantitative. The next step is to conduct a sensitivity analysis
to study whether the international e¤ects of a …scal shock are sensitive to
the value of the productivity of government spending.
3.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Crowding Out and Crowding In?
To complement the numerical analysis, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to
investigate to what extent the international e¤ects of a …scal shock are sen-
sitive to the choice of one key parameter: the productivity of government
spending. We do not show sensitivity analyses with respect to other pa-
rameter values because the macroeconomic e¤ects of a …scal shock are not
sensitive the choice of other parameter values. To show how the e¤ects of a
…scal shock depend on the positive e¤ect that government spending induces,
we set a high production elasticity of government spending 0.5, a parameter
value that is also used in Linnemann and Schabert (2006).
Figure 2 displays the dynamic e¤ects of a …scal shock in two cases. The
solid lines depict the case where ® = 0:2 and the dashed lines depict the
case where ® = 0:5. Note the response of the Home nominal interest rate is
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measured as percentage point deviation from initial equilibrium. The Fig-
ure shows that increasing the productivity of government spending causes
some interesting qualitative changes. First, if the productivity of govern-
ment spending is su¢ciently high, a …scal shock tends to increase Home
consumption. Second, if the productivity of government spending is high, a
…scal shock appreciates the nominal and real exchange rate. Third, a rise
in government spending can increase the interest rate if the productivity
government spending is high.
In the case where ® = 0:5, the response of consumption to a rise in gov-
ernment spending is positive as output increases substantially. The higher
the productivity of the government spending, the more Home output in-
creases. If government spending generates a su¢ciently strong e¤ect on pri-
vate production, a …scal shock does not need to lead a reduction in wealth
and private consumption. As mentioned, a rise in government spending
tends to decrease consumption due to the rise in taxes. On the other hand,
when government spending is productive, a rise in government spending has
a direct positive e¤ect on output and consequently consumption. When gov-
ernment spending generates a su¢ciently strong e¤ect on production, the
latter e¤ect dominates and consumption increases. In this case, the increase
in the real wage, not a fall in consumption, induces an increase in labor
supply.
Figure 2 displays that …scal shock can appreciate the nominal and real
exchange rate if government spending is productive. A …scal shock appreci-
ates the nominal exchange rate if the relative consumption change increases
the relative demand for Home money. In the case where ® = 0:5; Home
consumption increases more than Foreign consumption. Thus the relative
consumption change increases the relative demand for Home money and
consequently the nominal exchange rate appreciates. Under LCP, the ap-
preciation of the nominal exchange rate translates into a real appreciation.
Panel (h) shows that a high productivity of government spending implies
that a …scal shock can increase the interest rate. When the productivity of
government spending is su¢ciently productive, a …scal shock increases global
private consumption. Higher consumption implies higher money demand.
Thus higher government spending temporarily increases the global interest
rate.
In this section it is shown that if the productive of government spending
is su¢ciently high a rise in government spending increases Home consump-
tion, appreciates the exchange rate and increases the interest rate at the
same time. This does not have to be the case. A …scal shock increases
the interest rate if the global money demand increases. This does not re-
quire an increase in Home consumption. If we increase the productivity of
government spending, the response of Home consumption also becomes pos-
itive. This however does not yet imply an appreciation of the exchange rate.
The appreciation of the exchange rate requires such high productivity of
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government spending that Home consumption increases more than Foreign
consumption.
As emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 652), some of the precise
positive implications of their model depend on the exact manner in which
government spending enters it. A typical …nding in the NOEM literature
is, however, that a rise in government spending causes a fall in domestic
private consumption, a depreciation of the exchange rate and a decrease in
the interest rate. In this section it is shown that if we allow for productive
government spending, a rise in government spending will not necessarily
cause these e¤ects.
4 Conclusions
Virtually all NOEM models, that address …scal policy issues, can be criti-
cized for the assumption that government spending is does not a¤ect produc-
tivity or utility. This paper develops a model in which government spending
a¤ects productivity. The paper attempts to …ll a gap in the literature by
analyzing the consequences of productive government spending on the in-
ternational transmission of …scal policy.
We show that the introduction of productive government spending tends
to have a positive e¤ect on domestic consumption and output, compared
with the pure waste case, as in Linnemann and Schabert (2006). The in-
troduction of productive government spending also has a positive e¤ect of
foreign consumption, notwithstanding that the e¤ect on foreign output is
negative soon after the shock. This is due to the fact that the introduction
of productive government spending reinforces the impact of a …scal shock
on the current account. A higher foreign current account surplus reduces
labor supply but allows for a higher level of consumption, relative to the
pure waste benchmark.
We also demonstrate that the assumption of productivity government
spending has notable implications for the response of the nominal and real
exchange rate to a …scal shock. Relative consumption changes a¤ect the
exchange rate by changing relative money demand. If the productivity of
government spending is low or zero, a …scal shock induces a fall in con-
sumption because of higher taxes. In this case, the relative consumption
change decreases the relative demand for domestic money and consequently
the nominal exchange rate depreciates. In addition, the nominal deprecation
translates into a real depreciation. On the other hand, when the productiv-
ity of government spending is su¢ciently high, the expansion of production
possibilities o¤sets the fall in wealth induced by higher taxes. It is possi-
ble that a …scal shock increases domestic consumption more than foreign
consumption. In this case, the relative consumption change increases the
relative demand for domestic money and consequently the exchange rates
15
appreciate.
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Figure 1: Productive government spending – the impulse responses to an
unexpected permanent rise in Home government spending
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Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis, varying the productivity of government spend-
ing
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